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RECENT CASES

RECENT CASES
DELIVERY OF CARLOAD FREIGHT As A DEFENSE To LIABILITY As

A

CARRIER

The defendant, a railroad, spotted four carloads of freight consigned for
the plaintiff, an oil company, on the plaintiff's private spur track. The spur
was enclosed by a wire fence, the gates of which had to be opened in order to
be accessible to the defendant. The freight was not unloaded immediately, and
early the next morning a fire broke out in the plaintiff's mill and destroyed the
four cars with their contents intact. The shipment was made under the Uniform
Bill of Lading, which provides for 48 hours of free time for unloading before
demurrage charges begin. Held, that the defendant was liable as an insurer
until the expiration of the free time allotted by the bill of lading. The basis of
this decision was one of intent of the parties as expressed in the bill of lading,
a contractual relationship. The dissenting judge held that the defendant was
not liable either as an insuier or a warehouseman, as the goods had been placed
in the custody and control of the plaintiff, which constituted an actual delivery
by the defendant. On rehearing, after consideration of the issue of delivery,
Held, that the defendant was still in possession of the goods as. they were still
within the cars when they were destroyed. Red River Cotton Oil Co. et al. v.
Texas and P. Ry. Co., 44 So. (2d) 101 (La. 1949).
The court relied heavily upon Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Mark Owen & Co.1
as controlling authority for its decision. The decision of the latter case was also
based upon the construction given to a bill of lading with provisions almost
identical to those 2 in the instant case. The Supreme Court of the United States
held that the property in question had not been delivered, but that only access
was given to remove the property, and that 48 hours was given for this purpose,
and by necessary implication until the expiration of the 48 hour period the railroad company was an insurer of the property not removed. The cars in this
case were placed on a public delivery track and not on a private spur.
The common law rule, as to the liability of the common carrier for the loss
or injury of property received by it for transportation, is in the absence of a
1. 256 U.S. 427, 41 Sup. Ct. 554, 65 L. Ed. 1032 (1921).
2.

Sec. 1 (a) The carrier or party in possession of any of the property herein described
shall be liable as at common law for any loss thereof or damage thereto, except
as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 4 (a) Property not removed by the party entitled to receive it within the
free time allowed by tariffs, lawfully on file (such free time to be computed as
therein provided), after notice of the arrival of the property at destination or at
the port of export (if intended for export) has been duly sent or given, and after
placement of the property for delivery at destination has been made, may be kept
in vessel, car, depot, warehouse or place of delivery of the carrier, subject to the
tariff charge for storage and to carrier's responsibility as warehouseman, only, or
at the option of the carrier, may be removed to and stored in a public or licensed
warehouse at the place of delivery or other available place, at the cost of the
owner, and there held without liability on the part of the carrier, and subject to a
lien for all freight and other lawful charges, including a reasonable charges for
storage. Accord, forms 1584 and 1585 of the Union Pacific Railroad Co. (Uniform
Domestic order and straight bills of lading, adopted by Carriers in Official, Southern, Western and Illinois classification Territories, March 15, 1922, as amended
August 1, 1930, and June 15, 1941).
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special contract that of an insurer3 This liability commenced when the goods
were delivered to the carrier for shipment, and it continued until the carrier
4
had made an actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the consignee.
This rule was imposed by law for the protection of the shipper, and in order
5
to prevent fraud and deception by the carrier.
Previous to the decision of the Michigan Central case, placement of the
cars on the consignee's private siding has been held to be a sufficient delivery
6
to terminate the liability as an insurer. Delivery by the carrier has generally
been conceived as having four essential requisites. They are as follows: (a)
must be made to the proper person, (b) in a reasonable time, (c) at the proper
7
place, and (d) made in the proper manner. With reference to the facts of the
instant case these essentials have apparently been fulfilled.
The last duty to be performed by the carrier under a contract of carriage
is that of delivery of the goods.8 The interpretations of the decision in the Michigan Central case have been indeed relatively few in number in view of the general
proposition that the construction given to interstate bills of lading by the Federal
courts should govern the state courts.9 Some courts have grasped the naked
proposition set out in the Michigan Central case which is that of liability as an
insurer until the liability of warehouseman attaches without regard to the intent
of the parties.10
The Supreme Court of the United States did make a distinction in a casell
some five years later from the proposition in the Michigan Central. In this case
imposition of liability as a carrier was attempted on the ground that the carrier
remained liable for 48 hours after notification of arrival was given the consignee,
and therefore, it was liable as a garnishee irrespective of the fact that the carrier
had surrendered possession and control of the carload of goods to the consignee
before service of garnishment papers. It was held that section 4 (a) of the Uniform Bill of Lading was not applicable to this situation, and that nowhere does
the bill of lading state that once the carrier has surrendered control and custody
of the goods to the consignee upon the payment of the freight charges does it
have any right to repossess the goods.
3. 9 Am. Jur. 813, Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Blyth, 19 Wyo. 410, 118 P. 649, Ann.
Cas. 1913E 288 (1911).
4. 9 Am. Jur. 821, North Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 123 U.S.
727, 8 Sup. Ct. 266, 31 L. Ed. 287 (1887).
5. 13 C.J.S. 135.
6. Brennfleck v. Mobile & 0. R. Co., 184 Ala. 545, 63 So. 954 (1913) ; Arkansas Midland R. Co. v. Premier Cotton Mills, 109 Ark. 218, 158 S.W. 148 (1913) ; Massee
& Felton Lumber Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 40 Ga. App. 326, 149 S.E. 427 (1929)
Reid & Beam v. Southern Ry. Co., 149 N.C. 423, 63 S.E. 112 (1908).
7. Hutchinson on Carriers 398 (2d ed., Mechem, 1891)
8. Id. at 396.
9. James E. Tamsett, Appt. v. Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads, 207
Ala. 97, 91 So. 788, 22 A.L.R. 875 (1921).
10. Alton R. Co. v. Tucker et al., 138 F. 2d 796 (1943) ; Del Signore v. Payne, Director
General of Railroads, 89 W. Va. 275, 109 S.E. 232 (1921) ; Mangelsdorf Seed
Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 128 Kan. 729, 280 P. 896 (1929).
11. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Alvin R. Durham Co., 271 U.S. 251, 46 Sup. Ct. 509
(1926).
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Many of the state courts have not been prone to give the Michigan Central
case an interpretation as in the instant case. In a Virginia case, where a writ of
certiorari was denied, the carrier was held liable to the shipper for conversion
of the goods as the carrier's agent had pointed out the carload of goods consigned
to the consignee's agent who proceeded to unload the car without presenting the
bill of lading. The court held that where a carload of freight is placed upon a
delivery track and the consignee's agent is permitted to open it and commence
unloading it that such constitutes a final and complete delivery even though the
goods were returned. 12 A Missouri case held that a final delivery of the car terminated the carrier's liability as an insurer because the carrier's contractual
obligations had ceased. A final delivery was held to be spotting the cars at the
convenience of the consignee. 13 A Massachusetts case held that the delivery of a
car to a private siding for partial unloading was sufficient to terminate the
liability of the carrier.1n A Kentucky case held that where the consignee has
assumed full control over the carload of goods and such goods have been left in
the carrier's car that it constitutes a final and complete delivery to the consignee
15
and terminates the liability of the carrier.
The instant case is an apt example of imposing liability as an insurer after
the contract of carriage has been performed by the carrier. On rehearing, it
also sets up the proposition that the carrier was in possession of these goods as
the goods were still in the carrier's cars when destroyed even though the carrier
no longer had access to these cars, nor any right to recapture the actual possession of the cars. The Supreme Court of the United States remarked in a later
case16 in regard to its decision in the Michigan Central case that there was, not
a delivery of the goods which would terminate the liability of the carrier. Accordingly, the defense of delivery of the goods as terminating the carrier's liability
is apparently still available. The custody and control of the goods to the exclusion of the carrier whether within or without the carrier's cars should be sufficient to terminate the carrier's liability.
RICHARD ROSENBERRY.

RIGHT OF ACTION OF CHILD FOR PRE-NATAL INJURIES
A personal injury action was brought for injuries received due to the negligence of the defendant in the operation of its bus line. Plaintiff at the time of
the injury was a viable child existing in the womb of his mother. Held, that
injries wrongfully inflicted upon an unborn viable child capable of existing independently of his mother are injuries done him in his "person" within the meaning
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Aylor, 153 Va. 575, 150 S.E. 252, cert. denied, 282 U.S.
847, 51 Sup. Ct. 26, 75, L. Ed. 751 (1929).
13. Southern Advance Bag & Paper Co. v. Terminal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 171 S.W.
(2d) 107 (St. Louis Court of Appeals 1943).
14. Rice & Lockwood Lumber Co. v. Boston & M. R. R., 308 Mass. 101, 31 N.E. (2d)
12.

219 (1941).

15.
16.

Gus Datillo Fruit Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 251 Ky. 566, 65 S.W. (2d)
683 (1913).
See note 11 supra.

